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ACTUALLY WE SHOULD WAIT: EVALUATING THE OBAMA
ADMINISTRATION’S COMMITMENT TO UNILATERAL EXECUTIVEBRANCH ACTION
William P. Marshall*
INTRODUCTION
In 2008, then-Senator Obama ran for President on a platform that called for,
in part, an end to the expansive assertions of executive power that had been
advocated by the Bush administration. 1 Six years later, things have changed. Faced
with one of the most obstructionist Congresses in American history, 2 President
Obama tested the limits of presidential power in a range of circumstances. He used
his enforcement powers to implement stalled immigration reform; 3 he used recess

* © 2014 William P. Marshall. Kenan Professor of Law, University of North
Carolina. Thanks to Dana Remus and Richard Myers for their helpful comments and
suggestions and to David Pozen for stimulating many of the thoughts expressed in this
Article by sharing with me his as-yet unpublished article on presidential self-help. I am
also extremely grateful to Jessica L. Thompson for her research assistance.
1
Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s
Nonenforcement Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX.
L. REV. 781, 781 (2013); Laura Meckler, Obama Shifts View of Executive Power, WALL
ST. J. (Mar. 23, 2012, 12:31 AM), http://on.wsj.com/H0KB6p.
2
See ROBERT DRAPER, DO NOT ASK WHAT GOOD WE DO: INSIDE THE U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES xv–xix (2012) (quoting Republican Representative Kevin McCarthy as
saying, “We’ve gotta challenge [Democrats] on every single bill,” and noting that top
House Republicans met the night of President Obama’s inauguration to devise a plan to
“mortally wound” President Obama through “united and unyielding opposition”); Richard
H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in
America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 273–75 (2011) (describing the current dysfunctional state
of American politics). For a contrary view contending that the federal government is not
suffering a crisis of dysfunction, see Michael W. McConnell, Moderation and Coherence
in American Democracy, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 373 (2011).
3
See generally Policy Memorandum from U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs.,
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., on Parole of Spouses, Children and Parents of Active Duty
Members of the U.S. Armed Forces, the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve, and
Former Members of the U.S. Armed Forces or Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve and
the Effect of Parole on Inadmissibility Under Immigration and Nationality Act
§ 212(a)(6)(A)(i) (Nov. 15, 2013), available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/US
CIS/Laws/Memoranda/2013/2013-1115_Parole_in_Place_Memo_.pdf. The order directed
that the removal provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act not be enforced against
persons who had been illegally brought into the United States as children. Id. at 6 (“An
alien who entered without inspection will therefore remain ineligible for adjustment, even
after a grant of parole, unless he or she is an immediate relative . . . .” (emphasis added)).
This Article will refer to the President’s action as the “Dreamers Initiative.”
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appointments to circumvent congressional attempts to block his nominees; 4 and his
administration used its litigation authority to refuse to defend DOMA, although the
unconstitutionality of that statute was far from clear.5
To be sure, the administration’s record is not completely one-sided. President
Obama did not raise the debt ceiling unilaterally, although some argued that he had
the power to do so. 6 And he chose to seek authorization from Congress to engage
in military intervention in Syria although there was precedent suggesting he did not
have to. 7 But, by and large, President Obama has employed executive power
aggressively when he believed circumstances required.
Some have defended President Obama’s expansive use of presidential power
in these circumstances as justified precisely because Congress has become so
obstreperous. According to this view, the President does, and should have, the

4

See Melanie Trottman, Obama Makes Recess Appointments to NLRB, WALL ST. J.
(Jan. 4, 2012, 9:16 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405297020351360
4577141411919152318#. The controversy in this appointment stemmed in part from the
fact that it took place intrasession during a period when the Senate was convening pro
forma every three days. See generally Lawfulness of Recess Appointments During a
Recess of the Senate Notwithstanding Periodic Pro Forma Sessions, 36 Op. O.L.C. 1 (Jan.
6, 2012). In a formal opinion, the Justice Department opined that the use of the recess
appointment power was permissible in this circumstance. Id. at 1 (“The convening of
periodic pro forma sessions in which no business is to be conducted does not have the legal
effect of interrupting an intrasession recess otherwise long enough to qualify as a ‘Recess
of the Senate’ under the Recess Appointments Clause. In this context, the President
therefore has discretion to conclude that the Senate is unavailable to perform its adviseand-consent function and to exercise his power to make recess appointments.”). The issue
is currently before the U.S. Supreme Court. See Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490
(D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. granted sub nom. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 133 S. Ct. 2861 (2013).
5
In United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), the majority (five Justices)
struck down DOMA as unconstitutional. Id. at 2696. Three dissenters agreed that there was
no jurisdiction for the Court to hear the case. See id. at 2969 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting); id.
at 2697–98 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Thomas, J.). Justices Scalia and Thomas also
opined that DOMA was constitutional. Id. at 2705. While Justice Alito agreed with Justices
Scalia and Thomas on the merits, he disagreed as to standing and believed that the
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the House of Representatives (BLAG) could properly
defend DOMA. See id. at 2711–20 (Alito, J., dissenting). The duty of the President to
defend allegedly unconstitutional laws is discussed in Aziz Huq, Enforcing (But Not
Defending) “Unconstitutional” Laws, 98 VA. L. REV. 1001 (2012); Daniel J. Meltzer,
Lecture, Executive Defense of Congressional Acts, 61 DUKE L.J. 1183 (2012); Dawn E.
Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement of Constitutionally Objectionable Statutes, 63 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 27 (2000); Saikrishna Prakash, The Executive’s Duty to Disregard
Unconstitutional Laws, 96 GEO. L.J. 1613 (2008).
6
See Neil Buchanan & Michael Dorf, How to Choose the Least Unconstitutional
Option: Lessons for the President (and Others) from the Debt Ceiling Standoff, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 1175, 1176–78 (2012).
7
See Charlie Savage, Obama Tests Limits of Power in Syrian Conflict, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 8, 2013), http://nyti.ms/16dHV5p.
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power to aggressively use executive power when Congress does not act
responsively or appropriately. 8
This Article contests that position. It agrees with the premise that increased
polarization in American politics has made the work of the executive branch more
difficult and that this Congress in particular has failed to act responsibly. It also
agrees that presidents may no longer be able to expect that members of Congress
will abandon their partisan interests in favor of the common good. 9 It does not
agree, however, that separation-of-powers constraints on the presidency should be
adjusted to reflect this new political dynamic.
Presidential power has already expanded dramatically since the middle part of
the twentieth century, and it is increasingly difficult to contest the proposition
advanced by Martin Flaherty and others that the executive branch has become the
most dangerous branch. 10 In light of this reality, investing the presidency with even
more powers is problematic no matter what the circumstances.
Part I of this Article provides the necessary background by briefly describing
the partisan political gridlock faced by President Obama and identifying some of
the unilateral uses of presidential power employed by the Obama administration in
its efforts to overcome or circumvent its political opponent’s obduracy. Part II
places the Obama administration’s actions in context by discussing why
presidential power had already become so expansive and why it continues to
expand. Part III discusses the paradoxical role that congressional obstruction plays
8

See David Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Power, 124 YALE L.J.
(forthcoming Oct. 2014); Letter from Professor Hiroshi Motomura et al., to President
Barack Obama, Regarding Executive Authority to Grant Administrative Relief for
DREAM Act Beneficiaries (May 28, 2012), available at www.nilc.org/document.html?id=
754 (arguing that the President is empowered to selectively enforce immigration laws);
Susan Rosen Wartell, The Power of the President: Recommendations to Advance
Progressive Change, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Nov. 16, 2010), http://www.americanprogr
ess.org/issues/opengovernment/report/2010/11/16/8658/the-power-of-the-president/ (contending that the President has the power in a wide range of areas to take actions when
Congress will not act).
9
See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119
HARV. L. REV. 2312, 2318 (2006) (noting the transformation from a democracy of civic
virtue in the late eighteenth century to the Jacksonian democracy of the 1820s, which
involved more particularistic and partisanship interests).
10
See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
6 (2010) (“[T]he presidency represents the graver threat: while Schlesinger was prophetic
in sounding the alarm, it has become a far more dangerous institution during the forty years
since he wrote The Imperial Presidency—and these threatening trends promise to
accelerate over the decades ahead.”); Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of
Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123, 125 (1994) (“Now, it is the President
whose power has expanded and who therefore needs to be checked.”); William P. Marshall,
Eleven Reasons Why Presidential Power Inevitably Expands and Why It Matters, 88 B.U.
L. REV. 505 (2008) (arguing it is critical that both parties assure presidential power is at
least checked, if not reversed); Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE
L. J. 1725, 1727 (1996) (“Never has the executive branch been more powerful . . . .”).
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in relation to presidential power. As this Part notes, although congressional action
can stultify a President’s agenda, it may paradoxically serve as a catalyst for the
expansion of presidential power. Part IV identifies some of the concerns related to
the centering of power in the presidency and questions whether, for whatever
reasons, including congressional obstruction, presidential power should be
expanded in a manner that accentuates those concerns. Weighing the concerns of
government breakdown and harm to the national interest on one side versus
aggrandized presidential power on the other, it contends that the constitutional
answer to this question, with very minimal exception, should be no.
Two caveats before proceeding. First, this Article will focus on the
President’s power over domestic policy—the subject of President Obama’s “We
Can’t Wait” initiatives. The presidency historically has been construed as having
even more authority over foreign policy than domestic matters; 11 and the
President’s power to act unilaterally in the international arena also brings to the
fore different considerations than his actions back home. Second, the Article will
center on the question of whether presidential power should be further expanded
and does not address the issue of whether the settled accessions to the President’s
power that have accrued over the last two and one-quarter centuries should be
reneged. Taking back existing powers raises its own set of concerns. To begin
with, it may be unrealistic to argue that presidents should no longer use tools or
powers that have become commonplace. Further, the position that presidents
should no longer have powers that the executive branch has long exercised is also
in tension with the fact that, for better or worse, reliance on measures taken by
previous administrations has historically been treated as precedential authority in
adjudging the constitutionality of presidential action. 12
I. BACKGROUND
In his 2013 State of the Union Address, President Obama announced,
“America does not stand still—and neither will I.” 13 In so stating, the President
signaled that he was committed to relying on unilateral exercises of his power
when he was unable to work his agenda through Congress. President Obama’s
State of the Union speech, however, did not set forth a new strategy. The President
had earlier announced a “We Can’t Wait” strategy to exactly the same effect:14 the
11

See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 321–29 (1936). To
be sure, the line between foreign policy and domestic affairs is becoming increasingly
blurred—particularly in the context of surveillance policy and other matters related to the
war on terror.
12
See infra notes 45–48 and accompanying text.
13
President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 28 2014), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/28/president-barack-obamas-state-uni
on-address.
14
See Charlie Savage, Shift on Executive Power Lets Obama Bypass Rivals, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 23, 2012, at A1 (describing “We Can’t Wait” as a comprehensive strategy,
devised and labeled by the President himself in the fall of 2011, “to more aggressively use
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administration would do what it could to circumvent the gridlock in Congress and
accomplish several domestic policy initiatives through the unilateral exercise of
executive power. 15
The administration’s choice to pursue this strategy was understandable.
Beginning virtually the moment President Obama assumed office, congressional
Republicans made clear that they would block the key parts of the President’s
agenda when at all possible. 16 Further, lest they might waver in this course, those
same Republicans quickly learned that if they even appeared to be accommodating
to the Obama administration, they would face considerable political resistance
back home from an increasingly uncompromising conservative base. 17
The Republicans’ tactics led to anticipated results. Many of the President’s
nominees were not confirmed, and much of the President’s agenda was stalled. 18
The tactics also led to the federal government devolving into a state of chronic
dysfunction as the Senate minority’s use of the filibuster, along with Republican
control of the House after the 2010 elections, meant that the President could get
almost nothing through Congress. 19 The government shutdown in the fall of 2013
was just one of the many examples of this dysfunction. 20
executive power to govern in the face of Congressional obstructionism”); Remarks by the
President on the Economy and Housing, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Oct. 24, 2011, 2:15 PM), http:
//www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/10/24/remarks-president-economy-and-housi
ng (President Obama remarking “[w]ithout a doubt, the most urgent challenge that we face
right now is getting our economy to grow faster and to create more jobs. . . . [W]e can’t
wait for an increasingly dysfunctional Congress to do its job. Where they won’t act, I
will.”).
15
See A Year of Action: Pursuing Opportunity for All, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Feb. 8,
2014, 1:48 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2014/02/08/year-acti
on-pursuing-opportunity-all (video highlighting actions that President Obama has taken
“without waiting for Congress”).
16
See, e.g., DRAPER, supra note 2; David M. Herszenhorn, Hold On to Your Seat:
McConnell Wants Obama Out, N.Y. TIMES CAUCUS BLOG (Oct. 26, 2010, 5:12 PM),
http://nyti.ms/17Qyp63 (quoting Mitch McConnell interview with National Journal saying,
“The single most important thing we want to achieve is for President Obama to be a oneterm president”). But see Glenn Kessler, When Did McConnell Say He Wanted to Make
Obama a ‘One Term President’?, WASH. POST FACT CHECKER BLOG (Sept. 25, 2012, 6:00
AM), http://wapo.st/OmykmH (quoting Mitch McConnell in National Journal as saying, “I
don’t want the president to fail; I want him to change”).
17
See MICHAEL GRUNWALD, THE NEW NEW DEAL: THE HIDDEN STORY OF CHANGE
IN THE OBAMA ERA 19 (2012); Scott Keyes, Republicans in Disarray: Losing Candidates
Increasingly Unwilling to Unite Behind GOP Nominees, THINK PROGRESS (Aug. 31, 2010,
12:45 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/politics/2010/08/31/116639/republican-party-disunity/.
18
Binyamin Appelbaum, Nominees at Standstill as G.O.P. Flexes Its Muscles, N.Y.
TIMES, June 19, 2011, at A17.
19
According to one (albeit, partisan) study, as of November 22, 2013, the Senate had
filibustered eighty-two of President Obama’s nominees compared to eighty-six nominee
filibusters for all other presidents. See It’s Time to Fix This Unprecedented Obstruction,
DEMOCRATIC POL’Y & COMMC’NS CTR. (Nov. 22, 2013), http://www.dpcc.senate.gov/?p=b
log&id=276. At the same time, the passage of legislation under President Obama has
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The administration perceived this gridlock as a threat to the national interest. 21
As such, unilateral action seemingly became the only plausible alternative for the
President to address the problems facing the country and allow the President to
accomplish what he believed he was elected to achieve. President Obama’s State
of the Union Speech and his announcement of the “We Can’t Wait” strategy were
simply articulations of the administration’s commitment to a unilateral strategy
that had already begun. 22
The mechanisms used by the Obama administration in engaging in unilateral
executive-branch action were varied. Some of the President’s unilateral actions,
including agency rulemaking, 23 not defending the constitutionality of politically
controversial statutes, 24 and the use of the federal contracting power to exact
compliance with policy choices by private entities,25 had been used before. Others,
such as the recess appointment authority or the decision to selectively enforce
federal statutes, were taken to new levels.26

ground almost to a standstill. ‘Do-Nothing’ Congress on Track for One of the Least
Productive Years Ever, NBCNEWS.COM (Nov. 26, 2013, 1:57 AM), http://www.nbcnews.c
om/politics/politics-news/do-nothing-congress-track-one-least-productive-years-ever-v215
78861 (noting the current Congress’s scant record in passing legislation).
20
See Lori Montgomery & Karen Tumulty, Washington Braces for Prolonged
Government Shutdown, WASH. POST (Oct. 2, 2013, 3:47 AM), http://wapo.st/15Gx1Y1
(discussing the fall 2013 government showdown).
21
See Saul Jackman, President Obama Should Issue an Executive Order to Raise the
Debt Ceiling, BROOKINGS INST. FIXGOV BLOG (Oct 14, 2013, 11:30AM), http://www.bro
okings.edu/blogs/fixgov/posts/2013/10/12-debt-ceiling-and-the-power-of-the-president-jac
kman.
22
See David Jackson, Obama’s New Slogan: ‘We Can’t Wait’, USA TODAY (Oct. 24,
2011, 1:04PM), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval/post/2011/10/obamas-ne
w-slogan-we-cant-wait/1#.UuagZWQo568 (providing details of the President’s new policy
initiatives and intent to issue executive orders).
23
See, e.g., Sam Dillon, Obama to Seek Sweeping Changes in ‘No Child’ Law, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 1, 2010, at A1 (noting the President’s use of executive orders to implement
changes to No Child Left Behind legislation).
24
See Meltzer, supra note 5, at 1202–04 (providing examples of presidents refusing to
defend arguably constitutional statutes).
25
See Steven Greenhouse, Plan to Seek Use of U.S. Contracts as a Wage Lever, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 26, 2010, at A1; Ann O’Leary, The Power to Act, AM. PROSPECT (Sept. 1,
2010), http://prospect.org/article/power-act-0 (citing President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s
executive order “prohibiting defense contractors from discriminating on the basis of race”
and President Johnson’s Executive Order 11246 “prohibiting discrimination and requiring
affirmative action to assure representation of underrepresented minorities in the workforces
of businesses receiving federal contracts” as the first instances of presidents using the
federal contracting power to effectuate regulatory policies).
26
The President’s recess-appointment claim broke new ground by its conclusion that
an intrasession break constituted a recess. His decisions to selectively enforce immigration
and health-care laws presumed a new level of discretion in the President’s duty to see that
the laws are faithfully executed. See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 1, at 783 & n.8.
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Some of these actions were justiciable. The legality of the President’s recess
appointments, for example, is now before the U.S. Supreme Court. 27 Others
appeared to avoid the possibility of judicial review. The administration’s decision
not to defend DOMA, for example, would seem to be the type of executive-branch
action that the courts would rule nonjusticiable. 28 And with respect to other
matters, the jury (or, more accurately the judiciary) is still out. For instance, it is
unclear who might have standing to challenge the President’s decision to delay the
implementation of the Affordable Care Act or the decision not to enforce
immigration laws against certain immigrants who had come to the United States as
children. 29
But whether or not these actions will lead to court rulings, it is worthwhile to
pause for a moment and consider whether such aggressive use of presidential
power is consistent with the constitutional commitment to separation of powers
and whether, even if not technically illegal, such actions should be considered
appropriate under our constitutional structure.
In order to do so, however, we must first overcome an initial barrier.
Discussions of the legality of executive-branch actions often tend to devolve into
whether one supports the particular President then in office. This, of course, is not
really surprising. For one, it simply echoes the behavior of political actors.
Adherence to principle seldom seems to get in the way when the exercise of power
is at stake, 30 as time after time those who have adamantly opposed presidential
power by one President suddenly become executive power proponents when their
own candidate is in office (and vice versa).31
The reaction to presidential power based on who is in office is also
understandable because it is often based on intuitive trust and/or policy
predilection. A congressional demand for records, for example, is likely to be
reflexively perceived as nothing more than an attempt to embarrass a President by
those who support that administration, while at the same time, it is seen as a
necessary effort to uncover deep-rooted corruption or malfeasance by that
27

Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. granted sub nom.
NLRB v. Noel Canning, 133 S. Ct. 2861 (2013).
28
The constitutionality of the law, however, could be (and was) defended by other
litigants. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2684–89 (2013) (legislative group
permitted to defend the constitutionality of a federal law when the Attorney General would
not); see also Ryan W. Scott, Standing to Appeal and Executive Non-Defense of Federal
Law After the Marriage Cases, 89 IND. L.J. 67, 70–71 (2014).
29
Crane v. Napolitano, 920 F. Supp. 2d 724, 746 (N.D. Tex. 2013) (dismissing a
challenge to President Obama’s Dreamers Initiative for lack of standing); see also
Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 1, at 786 (contending that the legality of the Dreamers
Initiative is likely nonjusticiable).
30
See Frederick Schauer, Is Legality Political, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 481, 481–82
(2011); Marc Hetherington & Thomas Rudolph, Why Don’t Americans Trust the
Government? Because the Other Party Is in Power, WASH. POST MONKEY CAGE BLOG
(Jan. 30, 2014, 8:09 AM), http://wapo.st/1fjcMkq.
31
See, e.g., Hetherington & Rudolph, supra note 30.
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administration’s political opponents. Similarly, a President’s efforts to take
extraordinary measures in pursuit of favored policy goals such as combatting
global climate change or expanding aid to religiously based social services
organizations is likely to be viewed more sympathetically by those concerned
about those issues than those who are not. Thus, with respect to some of the
Obama administration’s actions, there seems little doubt that supporters of the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) will likely find the recess
appointment of Richard Cordray more justified than those who oppose that agency.
Similarly, those who believe the deportation of individuals who were raised within
the United States marks a profound injustice are far more likely to support the
administration’s Dreamers Initiative than those opposed to immigration reform. 32
For that reason, it may be advisable to introduce our discussion of presidential
power in a way that tries to eliminate any intuitive bias. Accordingly, when
considering some of the unilateral initiatives taken by President Obama, let us also
keep in mind the following hypothetical actions of a subsequent presidency.
1) A President’s refusal to defend the individual mandate provisions of the
Affordable Care Act against a takings or substantive due-process attack.
2) A President’s refusal to enforce the Affordable Care Act to collect the
necessary revenues to make the Act financially viable.
3) A President’s decision to selectively enforce civil-rights and voting-rights
laws.
4) A President’s use of his recess appointment powers over a long federal
holiday weekend to install a controversial candidate to the U.S. Supreme Court
after the Senate has overwhelmingly voted to reject that individual’s nomination.
II. THE EXPANSION OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER
There is little doubt that the congressional Republicans have successfully
been able to frustrate much of President Obama’s agenda virtually since the time
he took office (including the time period where the Democrats controlled both the
32
This is not always the case. Some notable conservatives have expressed sympathy
for the goals of President Obama’s Dreamers Initiative even as they have criticized his
unilateral actions. Gene Healy, Obama’s Executive Unilateralism, WASH. EXAMINER (June
18, 2012, 7:00 PM), http://washingtonexaminer.com/obamas-executive-unilateralism/articl
e/745481 (“Obama’s [mini-DREAM act] is hardly the most terrifying instance of
administration unilateralism. In fact, as a policy matter, it’s a humane and judicious use of
prosecutorial resources. But given the context, it stinks. It looks uncomfortably like
implementing parts of a bill that didn’t pass, and . . . the move sits uneasily with the
president’s constitutional responsibility to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed’”); Ilya Shapiro, President Obama’s Top 10 Constitutional Violations of 2013,
FORBES (Dec. 23, 2013 at 3:38 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/12/23/presi
dent-obamas-top-10-constitutional-violations-of-2013/ (criticizing congressional failure to
act and Obama’s unilateral action with respect to the immigration status of persons brought
into this country as children).
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House and Senate). This does not mean by itself, however, that the presidency
lacks sufficient power any more than a cold January means the planet is not
undergoing global warming. It simply means that this President has not been able
to exercise his power as successfully as he would have liked.
The reality is that President Obama came into power when executive-branch
power was (and is) at its historical apex. 33 Since the middle of the twentieth
century, presidential power has expanded at a dramatic rate, and that expansion
continues unabated. 34 Some of this is simply a result of a new sophistication and
assertiveness in the use by his predecessors of long-existing mechanisms of
presidential power. On the domestic side, for example, presidents have become
increasingly adept at using executive orders as a substitute for legislative action. 35
Moreover, as then-Professor Elena Kagan documented, presidents in recent years
have been increasingly able to master their ability to control the administrative
state to further their political and policy agendas. 36 Correspondingly, on the
international side, presidents have become increasingly adept at using executive
agreements as a substitute for Senate-ratified treaties and unilateral military action,
instead of declarations of war, to pursue their foreign policy goals. 37
The reasons why presidential power has dramatically expanded, however, do
not end with the fact that those sitting in the Oval Office have generally chosen to
use their office aggressively, although certainly that is a factor. 38 It is also due to a
number of factors that inevitably work to invest power in the executive branch,
whether intentional or not. 39 These include (1) the presidency is the only branch of
government that can act expeditiously in a more complex world that increasingly

33

See, e.g., MICHAEL A. GENOVESE, A PRESIDENTIAL NATION: CAUSES,
CONSEQUENCES, AND CURES 3 (2012) (“For better or worse, the United States is today a
presidential nation.”); Greene, supra note 10, at 125 (discussing the expansion of
presidential power since the founding).
34
Even a President such as Ronald Reagan, who was committed to reigning in the
federal government, was expansive in his use of presidential power. His executive order
taking control over agency rulemaking by subjecting it to review by the Office of
Management and Budget is widely considered one of the most extensive exercises of
power by executive order in history. See KENNETH MAYER, WITH THE STROKE OF A PEN:
EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 126–30 (2001).
35
See GRAHAM G. DODDS, TAKE UP YOUR PEN: UNILATERAL PRESIDENTIAL
DIRECTIVES IN AMERICAN POLITICS (2013) (discussing the role of executive orders in
setting national policy).
36
See generally Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245
(2001) (identifying an increase in presidential involvement in directing the administrative
state).
37
HAROLD J. KRENT, PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 88, 96 (2005).
38
As Michael Gerhardt has noted, presidents tend to be remembered when they
engage in inventive and daring exercises of presidential power and forgotten when they are
more cautious. MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FORGOTTEN PRESIDENTS: THEIR UNTOLD
CONSTITUTIONAL LEGACY xv (2013).
39
Marshall, supra note 10, at 509–19.
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calls for immediate action, 40 (2) the executive branch is the only branch able to
collect and maintain the data and information necessary for governing in complex
times, 41 (3) both media and popular culture tend to focus on the presidency as the
embodiment of the national government, 42 (4) the presidency possesses vast
military and intelligence capabilities, 43 and (5) the fact that the executive branch
has grown massively, giving the President enormous resources at his disposal to
set and frame policy. 44
Further, there are two other factors of particular interest for our purposes that
have led to the expansion of presidential power. The first is legal. In the
jurisprudence surrounding executive-branch authority, the constitutionality of the
exercise of presidential power builds upon itself. 45 In both the opinions of the
federal courts and the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice,46
actions taken by one President serve as precedents in justifying actions taken by
later presidents. 47 That means, essentially, that the exercise of presidential power

40

Mark Tushnet, Controlling Executive Power in the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 2673, 2677–78 (2005).
41
See Neal Devins, Congressional-Executive Information Access Disputes: A Modest
Proposal—Do Nothing, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 109, 111–16 (1996); Patricia M. Wald &
Jonathan R. Siegel, The D.C. Circuit and the Struggle for Control of Presidential
Information, 90 GEO. L.J. 737, 737 (2002). In the words of Francis Bacon, “knowledge is
power.” See JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 111 (Christopher Morley & Louella
D. Everett eds., 11th ed. Little, Brown & Co. 1940) (1882) (attributing “Nam et ipsa
scientia potestas est” (knowledge is power) to Francis Bacon).
42
See STEPHEN J. FARNSWORTH, SPINNER IN CHIEF: HOW PRESIDENTS SELL THEIR
POLICIES AND THEMSELVES 3–4 (2008). Cf. NEIL POSTMAN, AMUSING OURSELVES TO
DEATH: PUBLIC DISCOURSE IN THE AGE OF SHOW BUSINESS 125–41 (1985) (articulating the
way television advertisements have become the primary means of communication between
government representatives and the people).
43
Norman C. Bay, Executive Power and the War on Terror, 85 DENV. U. L. REV.
335, 338 (2005).
44
See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers
and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 587–91 (1984) (discussing the President’s
authority and direction of agencies).
45
See Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Essay, Presidential Power,
Historical Practice, and Legal Constraint, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1097, 1140 (2013)
(summarizing the normative power internalized by the executive branch and appearance of
legal constraints).
46
The OLC is the entity within the Justice Department that reviews the legality of
presidential actions. See, e.g., id. at 1101. Because so much of what the President does is
not justiciable, the role of OLC is especially critical in setting the parameters of
presidential power. Id.
47
See Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation
of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 412–13 (2012) (“Arguments based on historical
practice are a mainstay of debates about the constitutional separation of powers.”).
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works as a one-way ratchet, with each successive President able to rely on the
actions of his predecessors as legal justification for his own initiatives. 48
The second is political pressure. One of the unanticipated byproducts of the
expansion of presidential power is that it imposes increased political demands
upon the office. The more power the President has, the more expectations are
placed upon his presidency.
For this reason, the growth in presidential power that has occurred since the
founding does not always work to the President’s advantage. In the current
political climate, for example, there is no doubt that the President is perceived by
some as the main player in the setting of the national agenda. 49 Yet, at the same
time, the assertion advanced by many that presidential powers are far less
expansive than that perceived by the electorate is undoubtedly true. 50 The power of
the President is limited in many key respects. 51 He cannot enact legislation, 52
appropriate funds, 53 enter into treaties, 54 declare war, 55 or even assign people to
key government positions on his own 56—even when the public expects him to act
and even when he has promised to do so. 57
The gap between the expectations placed on the presidency and its ability to
meet those demands, therefore, can be a source of political embarrassment to any
48

See Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive in the First
Half-Century, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1451, 1561 (1997) (noting how the first seven
presidents exercised the power of the office over the executive branch with vigor and
without much limitation).
49
See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, The President: Lightning Rod or
King?, 115 YALE L.J. 2611, 2613 (2006).
50
See, e.g., id. (“The President’s formal powers under the Constitution are far too
narrow to justify the hoopla that surrounds presidential elections.”); ALAN BRINKLEY ET
AL., NEW FEDERALIST PAPERS: ESSAYS IN DEFENSE OF THE CONSTITUTION (1997); Steven
G. Calabresi, The Era of Big Government Is Over, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1015, 1040 n.141
(1998) (citing Theodore Lowi’s proposition that “‘the expectations of the masses have
grown faster than the capacity of presidential government to meet them’”).
51
See ANDREW RUDALEVIGE, THE NEW IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY: RENEWING
PRESIDENTIAL POWER AFTER WATERGATE 262 (2006) (“[T]he power of the president,
however great, remains conditional.”).
52
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
53
Id. art 1, §§ 8–9.
54
Id. art 1, § 8; id. art. 2, § 2; id. art. 6.
55
Id. art. 1, § 8.
56
Id. art. 2, § 2. But see id. art. 2, § 2, cl. 2 (defining power of the President to appoint
during congressional recesses).
57
A very recent instance of this, for example, is President Obama’s inability to close
Guantanamo despite his promises that he would do so. See Carol Rosenberg, Why Obama
Can’t Close Guantanamo: National Security Policy Is Foiled by Congressional Politics
and Bureaucratic Infighting, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Dec. 14, 2011), http://www.foreignaffairs.
com/articles/136781/carol-rosenberg/why-obama-cant-close-guantanamo. The irony of
Guantanamo is that although the use of the facility as a detention center was created by
executive order, it may be ended only with the assistance of Congress. Id.
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president. 58 Indeed, for precisely this reason, some commentators have argued that
the President’s power should be sufficient to meet those expectations. 59 For
reasons advanced elsewhere, I am not persuaded that the expectations placed on
the office of the presidency should by themselves create a legal basis for a
President’s expanded use of powers. 60 But I do not question that the existence of
those expectations provide an enormous political incentive for a President to act
aggressively. Presidents, after all, do not want to be perceived as failures. 61
Faced with such expectations, it becomes extraordinarily difficult for a
President not to use the powers that are seemingly available, and few presidents
have been able to voluntarily avoid that temptation. 62 The political scales are such
that, whether ideologically committed to a powerful presidency or not, any
President is likely to be aggressive in the use of tools at his disposal. 63
III. THE ROLE OF CONGRESSIONAL OBSTRUCTION
The story of the expansion of presidential power, however, is not only the
story of the executive branch. It is also a tale of congressional behavior. In that
respect, Congress has been far from blameless.
Most fundamentally, as many observers have noted, Congress has become
increasingly reluctant to defend its institutional prerogatives in the face of the
exercise of presidential power. Rather, instead of presenting a common concern for
protecting their institutional authority, members of both parties have instead let
partisan concerns dominate their agendas. 64 Accordingly, Congress has often been

58

Two recent examples of a President being unable to pass a central part of his
agenda include President George W. Bush’s failure to achieve social security privatization
and President Bill Clinton’s failure to enact health-care reform.
59
See Calabresi, supra note 50, at 1040. Cf. BARBARA HINCKLEY, THE SYMBOLIC
PRESIDENCY: HOW PRESIDENTS PORTRAY THEMSELVES 145 (1990) (arguing that the
President must act beyond constitutional parameters in order to meet public expectations
regarding his foreign-policy role).
60
I have argued elsewhere that increased expectation on the presidency should not
lead to awarding him with more political power. See William P. Marshall, Why the
Assertion of a “Nationalist” Presidency Does Not Support Claims for Expansive
Presidential Power, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 549, 552 (2010) (asserting that additional grants
of presidential authority are unwarranted because of the current imbalance between
Congress and the presidency).
61
GENE HEALY, THE CULT OF THE PRESIDENCY 7–9 (2008) (discussing our
“Plebiscitary Presidency” and “Congressional Abdication”).
62
See GERHARDT, supra note 38, at xii (noting that although Whig presidents were
ideologically opposed to broad uses of presidential power, they nevertheless exercised
those powers aggressively).
63
Id.
64
Levinson & Pildes, supra note 9, at 2313, 2319, 2329–30.
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compliant in the expansion of presidential power—particularly when the President
and congressional majorities are from the same party. 65
The actions of congressional Republicans during the Obama administration
showcase another reason why presidential power expands—congressional
intransigence can at times be as much of a catalyst as congressional acquiescence
in leading to a President’s use of power. And this is particularly true when that
intransigence can be tied to obstructionist tactics that are arguably outside the
bounds of appropriate legislative behavior. 66
Consider, for example, the decision by Senate Republicans not to allow a vote
on Richard Cordray’s appointment to the CFPB. By most accounts, the Republican
opposition to Cordray stemmed not from any objection to him personally but
because they objected to the creation of the CFPB that he was nominated to lead. 67
But the CFPB had already been created by statute over Republican opposition, and
the move to block Cordray was simply an effort to effectively block an agency
from being able to accomplish what it was created to do. Blocking Cordray, in
short, was an attempt to repeal the CFPB through the back door.
The same strategy was taken to a more extreme level in the appropriations
battle that led to the government shutdown in the fall of 2013. In that instance, a
number of Republicans indicated that they would not vote for an appropriations
bill unless the administration agreed to repeal the Affordable Care Act, even
though the appropriations measures had nothing to do with the implementation or
even the funding of that legislation. 68 Again, the effort was to try to force the
repeal of a law that they did not have the legislative ability to repeal directly; but,
in this case the Republicans elevated their tactics by in effect holding an unrelated
measure hostage to their legislative demands. (To place this in perspective by
using a counterpartisan example, consider a situation in which congressional
Democrats assert that they will not agree to pass any appropriations bills unless the
Republican administration agreed to take unrelated measures such as ending the
65

To be sure, this is not always the case. Many congressional Democrats, for
example, opposed the enactment of the line item signed into law by President Clinton,
while a majority of Republicans supported this measure. See U.S. SENATE, U.S. Senate Roll
Call Votes 104th Congress—1st Session (Mar. 23, 1995), http://www.senate.gov/legislative
/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=104&session=1&vote=00115; OFFICE OF THE CLERK, U.S. HOUSE OF REPS., Final Vote Results for Roll Call 95 (Feb. 6,
1995), http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1995/roll095.xml. The Court eventually struck down the
cancellation procedures in the Line Item Veto Act in Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417
(1998).
66
See Pozen, supra note 8 (manuscript at 3–5).
67
See Jay Carney, Press Secretary, White House Press Briefing (Jan. 5, 2012),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2012/01/05/press-briefing
#transcript (“[T]he case here is pretty stark. The Republicans unfortunately in the Senate
simply refused to allow Richard Cordray to have an up or down vote—not for any reason
that had to do with his qualifications. . . . Why? Because they don’t even want the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to be in operation.”).
68
See Jonathan Wiseman, A Texas Senator Stops Talking, and a Vote on Spending
Nears, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2013, at A1.
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use of the federal death penalty or appointing a Supreme Court Justice with a leftof-center ideology.)
David Pozen has offered a thoughtful and creative argument that a Congress
employing such tactics may be justly criticized as violating what he terms the
“constitutional conventions” present in interbranch relationships that allow the
government to effectively function. 69 But one does not even have to reach Pozen’s
theoretical conclusions in order to recognize that a President will feel compelled to
do something whenever he believes that his powers are being improperly curtailed.
Given both the expectations placed upon the office and the ambitions of those
elected to it, a President who believes he has been wrongly cornered is likely to
strike back. The problem if he does so, however, is that his actions will affect the
lines in separation-of-powers concerns long after he has left office. As long as his
actions do not cross justiciability lines, or as long as Congress does not have the
political will or muscle to undo the President’s efforts, his actions will serve to
legitimize similar actions taken by successors to the office. The irony of
congressional obstruction, in short, is that it can work to increase presidential
power in the long run. 70
IV. UNCHECKED PRESIDENTIAL POWER VERSUS CONGRESSIONAL OBSTRUCTION
A. The Dangers of Centering Power in the Presidency
The high-school-civics arguments against vesting too much power in any one
individual hardly needs significant embellishment here, as both history and
elementary political theory offer more than substantial evidence of the dangers
created by single-person power. On the historical side, one needs to look no further
than twentieth-century Europe to see the dangers inherent in single-person rule. 71
On the theoretical side, one needs to look no further than the separation-of-powers
theory advanced in Federalist 47 to understand the relevant political point. As
Madison wrote, “[t]here can be no liberty where the legislative and executive
69
Pozen, supra note 8 (manuscript at 4). Pozen then goes on to argue that
congressional violation of such conventions may serve to provide a legal justification for a
president to engage in methods of self-help that can include some uses of power that are
otherwise outside his constitutional limitations. Id. A full analysis of Pozen’s legal position
that congressional misfeasance can or should serve to justify a President’s extraordinary
use of power is beyond the scope of this Article although this Article does note that any
President’s use of power, no matter what its rationale, inevitably serves to justify similar
uses of power by subsequent presidencies. This Article further discusses the issue in supra
notes 45–48 and accompanying text and infra notes 70, 75–78 and accompanying text.
70
See, e.g., GERHARDT, supra note 38, at 4–11 (noting the Whig Party’s
obstructionism in the face of President Martin Van Buren’s efforts to lead the country out
of an economic crisis ended up having the long-term effect of empowering the presidency).
71
See generally BRUCE F. PAULEY, HITLER, STALIN AND MUSSOLINI:
TOTALITARIANISM IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (3d ed. 2009) (explaining the dangers of
single-person power in all three forms of European totalitarianism).
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powers are united in the same person or body . . . .” 72 Furthermore, and beyond
separation-of-powers concerns alone, the danger of combined power becomes even
greater when that power is vested in a single person; a single ruler necessarily
allows for more secrecy and less transparency than government by collective
bodies. 73
For these reasons, many have already sounded the alarm about the increasing
power of the presidency. Bruce Ackerman, for example, has argued that the
increased availability of the presidency’s unilateral powers has already
“transformed the executive branch into a serious threat to our constitutional
tradition.” 74 And when so much executive action is beyond the purview of the
courts and outside the focus of a Congress that is more interested in partisan
victories than protecting its institutional prerogatives, his warning does not seem to
be beyond the pale.
Yet, even if one does not yet hear the clarion-call warning of a too-powerful
executive, there are serious concerns that should be considered before one too
quickly defends unilateral executive-branch actions. One primary factor in this
respect is the role of precedent. As noted above, every presidential action serves as
precedent to justify similar exercise of power by successor office holders.75
The authority of precedent, moreover, works not only legally, but also
politically. Each presidential action makes it easier politically for successive
presidencies to use the same tactic. The recognition of this reality, in turn, is
particularly significant because when so many issues of the legality of presidential
power are beyond the reach of the courts, the one remaining check on unilateral
presidential action is political. The claim that a President is acting beyond his
powers can be a potent one, and there are numerous instances when presidents
have suffered some political backlash for acting alone.76 Indeed, as of this writing,
President Obama’s political opponents are seeking to use his “We Can’t Wait”
strategy as a rallying cry against his efforts. 77 But arguments claiming that a
President has exceeded his bounds in engaging in a specific action lose much of
their strength when the forces marshaling those arguments have supported or

72

THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 216–17 (James Madison) (Jim Manis ed., 2001)
(quoting Montesquieu).
73
See generally Heidi Kitrosser, Supremely Opaque?: Accountability, Transparency,
and Presidential Supremacy, 5 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 62 (2011) (noting the
lack of transparency inherent in a single executive); Heidi Kitrosser, The Accountable
Executive, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1741 (2009) (noting the same).
74
ACKERMAN, supra note 10, at 4.
75
See supra notes 46–48 and accompanying text.
76
See, e.g., GERHARDT, supra note 38, at 76–77 (discussing the political backlash
against the unilateral exercise of power exercised by President Zachary Taylor).
77
David Nakamura & Ed O’Keefe, Boehner: Immigration Reform Stalls Because
GOP Has ‘Widespread Doubt’ About Obama, WASH. POST (Feb. 7, 2014), http://wapo.st/1
fM8XVQ (noting political backlash against President Obama for having exercised powers
unilaterally).
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promoted similar actions by previous presidents. 78 In short, presidential actions not
only serve to provide legal justifications for successor presidents, they also provide
political cover for that successor’s actions. 79
Equally troubling, unilateral exercises in presidential power also provide
political impetus for successor presidents to replicate those actions. As we have
seen, successor presidents will be pressured by the expectations placed on the
presidency to engage in whatever actions they can to meet those demands. 80
Moreover, as a practical political matter, if an earlier President has taken unilateral
action in response to the demands of one of his constituencies, it will become
increasingly difficult for the next President to turn down a request for unilateral
executive action from one of his constituencies. The genies of unilateral executive
action are not easily returned to the bottle.
To take us back, then, to our previous hypotheticals, 81 this means that a
President’s decision not to defend DOMA becomes precedent and, perhaps,
incentive for a later administration’s decision not to defend the ACA or another
disfavored statute. The decision to selectively enforce immigration laws serves to
justify and perhaps tempt a later administration’s decision to not enforce, or to
selectively enforce, civil rights or voting rights laws. Choosing to use the recessappointment power to circumvent nomination gridlock works to support and
perhaps induce a later administration’s decision to use the recess-appointment
power even more expansively.
There is, of course, an age-old lesson in this: what goes around comes
around. 82
B. The Dangers of Congressional Obstruction
At this point, it is necessary to point out that the perils of a too-powerful
presidency are not the only dangers to the national polity. Obstructionism also
poses a serious threat to democracy, and congressional behavior that brings
government to a standstill imposes very real and serious hardships. The loss of
social-security checks or other government benefits places people’s lives at risk.
Government shutdowns and/or government defaults can trigger major economic
disruptions. A failure to properly fund the military and/or provide for the
maintenance of the nation’s intelligence capabilities threatens national security.
78

This, of course, does not mean that many who supported unilateral exercises of
presidential power by previous administrations will not object to similar exercises of
presidential power (for substantive goals that they do not support) nonetheless. Intellectual
honesty, unfortunately, is not a hallmark of our current political climate.
79
President George W. Bush’s reliance on President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s use of
military tribunals to try Nazi saboteurs as precedent for trying alleged terrorists after 9/11 is
notable in this respect. See KRENT, supra note 37, at 148.
80
See supra notes 46–63 and accompanying text.
81
See discussion in supra Part I.
82
See very generally JUSTIN TIMBERLAKE, What Goes Around . . . Comes Around, on
FUTURESEX/LOVESOUNDS (Thomas Crown Studios 2006).
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And while the twentieth century is replete with the tragedies of single-person
dictatorships, 83 it also shows how political dysfunction can be a factor in breeding
the conditions from which a totalitarian state can emerge. 84
The assertion that a President may need to unilaterally act over congressional
opposition in order to protect the nation, in short, may at times be valid. 85 Indeed,
it may even be that a President who waits too long for a recalcitrant Congress to
act in times of crises should be blameworthy for allowing the nation’s welfare to
fall into jeopardy. The assertion that a President should never be able to
circumvent congressional obstruction, therefore, may be a claim that goes too far.
Yet, even here when the consequences of obstructionism look dire, it may still
be problematic to reflexively dismiss or even minimize the legitimacy of
Congress’s actions. To begin with, distinguishing between when a President acts
because overarching national concerns are at stake and when he does so based on
his political imperatives is a particularly difficult line to draw—and the matter is
only further compounded by the fact that presidents tend to see their own agenda
and the country’s agenda as essentially indistinguishable. Presidents, in short, will
almost always overstate the threat.
More to the point, congressional action blocking a President is not always
inherently pernicious. The Constitution was designed so that one branch could
check the actions of the other. 86 That Congress can frustrate the efforts of even a
very popular President is what separation of powers presumes.
There is also a problem in definition: what a President might see as pernicious
obstruction might very well be seen by the Congress itself as no more than its duty
to stand up to policies with which it disagrees. And in this respect, the fact that a
President may believe that he was elected to further a particular agenda should not
matter. The very nature of separation of powers is that the election is only the first
step, and not the last, in determining what is ultimately enacted into law.
Accordingly, if Congress (or even just a minority within Congress) disagrees with
the President’s perspective on the dangers facing the nation and has tools at its
disposal to fight against the President’s policies, why should it not be expected to
use those tools to do so—even when gridlock follows?
To be sure, congressional obstruction is much harder to defend when its only
purpose is to cause a particular President to fail. Yet, even then, the critique that
the opposition has somehow acted “wrongly” is not as straightforward as might be
initially assumed. We now live in an era that some have termed the “permanent

83

See generally PAULEY, supra note 71.
See, e.g., ERIC D. WEITZ, WEIMAR GERMANY: PROMISE AND TRAGEDY 81–83
(2007) (noting the role of political dysfunction in Weimar Germany as providing an
opening for the Nazi takeover).
85
For an argument that the need for the President to act may provide legal authority
for him to do so, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitution of Necessity, 79 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1257 (2004).
86
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 232 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison) (Jim
Manis ed., 2001).
84
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campaign,” 87 where each elected official is constantly seeking traction for the next
election, and neither side wants to give any quarter to the other for fear of losing
the same. Accordingly, if the President seeks to gain (or would likely gain)
electoral momentum by his actions, 88 why should the oppositions’ attempts to
stultify that effort be any more problematic? James Madison, after all, might have
described this scenario as simply “[a]mbition . . . made to counteract ambition.” 89
C. Who Should Prevail?
There is no easy answer as to who should prevail when the choice is between
unilateral presidential action on one side and congressional obstruction on the
other. 90 Both are fraught with inherent peril. The obvious solution is that both sides
should seek to avoid using or provoking any excesses in power by working
together with the broader interests of the country in mind; yet, that hope
undoubtedly seems naive given our current state of political antagonism and
dysfunction. 91 A second approach might be to remind the political actors that, even
if they are not likely to be moved by a sense of bipartisanship, they should at least
be concerned that their tactics will be used as precedent by their opposition when
the other side has the opportunity. 92 Still, it is hard to be optimistic that this
stratagem will work either, given that thinking long term does not appear to be a
prevalent mode of thought in today’s political climate.
For these reasons, I would suggest that the answer to who should prevail in
the battles waged over the President’s power to unilaterally trump congressional
87

See SIDNEY BLUMENTHAL, THE PERMANENT CAMPAIGN 7 (1980).
See BRENDAN J. DOHERTY, THE RISE OF THE PRESIDENT’S PERMANENT CAMPAIGN
6 (2012) (arguing that presidents are increasingly acting with an eye to the next election).
89
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 86, at 232. A better argument might be that
there are certain congressional tactics that are, or should be deemed, out of bounds because
they are excessively countermajoritarian. There is the so-called Hastert rule, under which
the House majority will not bring a measure to the floor for a vote unless a majority of the
majority supports the measure. See Mark Strand & Tim Lang, The Hastert Rule, CONG.
INST. (July 17, 2013), http://conginst.org/2013/07/17/the-hastert-rule/. The Hastert rule
might be criticized since it prevents the House from voting on provisions that might
otherwise have the support of a majority of house members (if not a majority of the
majority party). The wholesale use of the filibuster to block a President’s nominees or key
legislation might be similarly condemned if it systematically works to prevent Senate
majorities from acting. See supra notes 16–20 and accompanying text (noting the number
of filibusters taken against President Obama’s nominees). Nevertheless, the conclusion that
those procedures are somehow illegal is difficult to maintain given their historic practice
and the fact that the Constitution gives relatively free rein to congressional behavior. See,
e.g., U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its
Proceedings . . . .”).
90
And it may be that we will never have a judicial opinion on the subject, given
justiciability concerns.
91
See supra notes 16–20 and accompanying text.
92
See supra notes 45–48 and accompanying text.
88
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obstruction should be based on a simple calculus. 93 Which is more dangerous to a
democracy—unilateral presidential power or congressional obstruction? My sense
is the former. Congress may have the ability to obstruct, but it otherwise does not
have the day-to-day powers of the modern presidency. It can control the purse, but
it does not control the myriad components of the federal bureaucracy. It can pass
legislation, but it cannot create law at the stroke of a pen. 94 It can engage in
political theatrics, but it does not have the dramatic setting of the Oval Office from
which to issue its pronouncements.
Further, given the massive growth in presidential authority that has already
occurred, 95 it makes sense that the strong presumption should be against the further
expansion of the powers of the executive. As Abner Greene has argued, “Now, it is
the President [instead of Congress] whose power has expanded and who therefore
needs to be checked.” 96
To be sure, as noted previously, 97 there may be a need for some exceptions if
and when congressional obstruction truly threatens the nation. But those
exceptions should be extraordinarily limited. Indeed, Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Company v. Sawyer 98 may have already set the standard. If taking over the steel
mills to assist in a war effort is not a satisfactory rationale to overcome a
recalcitrant Congress, 99 there should be very few other justifications that suffice. 100
Certainly the mere claim that “we can’t wait” or that “America does not stand still”
should not alone provide the necessary justification to increase the President’s
powers. 101

93

As David Pozen notes, those battles are far more often waged in the political arena
than in the courts, as both sides make the public constitutional case that each other’s
actions are proper or improper. See Pozen, supra note 8 (manuscript at 46–48) (citing Eric
A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 991 (2008));
Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 523 (2004); see also
Bradley & Morrison, supra note 45, at 1140 (noting the tendency of the executive branch
to justify its actions on legal grounds).
94
See MAYER, supra note 34, at 4 (analyzing how presidents have “used a tool of
executive power . . . to wield their inherent legal authority”).
95
See supra notes 33–48 and accompanying text.
96
Greene, supra note 10, at 125.
97
See supra notes 64–70, 83–85 and accompanying text.
98
343 U.S. 579 (1952).
99
Id. at 585–89.
100
As Justice Jackson stated in his iconic Youngstown concurrence, the President’s
power is at its lowest ebb when he “takes measures incompatible with the expressed or
implied will of Congress.” Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
101
See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, Executive Overreach: How Both Parties Have
Ignored the Constitution, COMMONWEAL (Sept. 14, 2012, 11:01 AM), https://www.commo
nwealmagazine.org/executive-overreach.
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CONCLUSION
Although once committed to stemming the tide of presidential power
expansion, President Obama has since become a proponent of energetic unilateral
executive-branch action. Faced with a relentless and uncompromising opposition
in Congress, the President has come to believe that it is only through the exercise
of his unilateral powers that he will be able to accomplish his agenda and meet the
promises that he made to the American people.
At one level, President Obama’s motivations are understandable. Congress
has become unduly obstructionist, and because of its obstreperousness, many
serious problems facing the country have gone unresolved. Nevertheless,
expanding presidential power is a risky business in the long term even if it offers
considerable benefits now. Already the balance of power between the executive
and the legislative branches in Washington has, through the forces of history and
exigency, swung markedly towards the former. When one adds to this equation the
inherent and limitless potential for abuse in any government in which power is
centered in a single individual, the conclusion that the presidency is now the most
dangerous branch is indisputable. The assertion that its powers should be further
increased, therefore, requires a far stronger rationale than “we can’t wait.”

